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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d)(Supp. 1991), whereby the defendant in a 
circuit court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of 
Appeals from a final order on a misdemeanor offense. In this case 
the Honorable Robin W. Reese, Judge, Third Circuit Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, rendered final judgment and 
conviction for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following rules, statues and 
constitutional provisions are provided in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1953 as amended) 
Amendment IV, United STates Constitution 
Article I, § 7 and § 14, Utah Constitution 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. The broad, general description broadcast by radio 
dispatch lacked sufficient detail or similarity to Mr. 
Case and his situation to constitute reasonable suspicion 
to stop his vehicle. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In State v. Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rpts. 3-7, (Utah 1994), the 
Utah Supreme Court clarified that in reviewing reasonable suspicion 
conclusions are reviewed for correctness. JEd. at 6. However, 
because reasonable suspicion determinations involve the application 
of law to fact requires that some measure of discretion is given to 
the trial judge when applying the correction of error standard to 
a set of facts. Id at 5. 
The Supreme Court articulated the standard of review for 
reasonable-suspicion determinations as follows: 
We conclude that the proper standard of review to be 
applied to a trial court determination of whether a 
specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion 
is a determination of law and is reviewable 
nondeferentially for correctness, as opposed to being a 
fact determination reviewable for clear error.[footnote 
omitted] We further conclude that the reasonable-
suspicion legal standard is one that conveys a measure of 
discretion to the trial judge when applying that standard 
to a given set of facts. Precisely how much discretion 
we cannot say, but we would not anticipate a close, de 
novo review. On the other hand, a sufficiently careful 
review is necessary to assure that the purposes of the 
reasonable-suspicion requirement are served, [footnote 
omitted] 
Id. at 6. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On September 24, 1992, the trial court heard James B. Case's 
motion to suppress evidence obtained following the stop of his 
3 
vehicle by a University of Utah police officer. See Motion to 
Suppress Transcript (hereafter MTr.) R.165. Case argued that the 
officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Case or his 
passenger. At the close of the evidence the trial court made 
preliminary factual findings and requested that counsel file post 
hearing memoranda. MTr. 20-21, R. 31-45, 46-50. The trial court 
denied Mr. Case's motion to suppress on November 9, 1992. See 
Ruling Transcript 198 (hereafter RTr.) Written Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law were signed on December 23, 1992 and a 
Supplemental Conclusions of Law was signed January 11, 1993. (A 
copy of the trial judge's written findings and conclusions are 
attached as addendum B) R.99-102, 104. On February 22, 1993, Mr. 
Case entered a conditional guilty plea, pursuant to State v. Serv, 
758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), reserving the right to appeal the 
issues raised at the suppression hearing. Sentencing was then 
stayed pending appeal. R. 125. On September 7, 1993 this court 
issued a ruling dismissing the appeal finding that a final judgment 
had not been entered. R. 145. Mr. Case was sentenced on October 
14, 1993. R. 153. A Certificate of Probable Cause was granted and 
imposition of sentence was stayed pending appeal. R. 149-150. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 26, 1992, a telephone caller, whose identity and 
veracity were never established by the State, contacted the 
University of Utah police to allege a possible wrongdoing. MTr. 
2,3,5,6. The details of the telephone conversation, however, were 
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not conveyed to the investigating officers. MTr. 3,5. Police 
dispatch merely claimed that there was a possible "car prowl" or 
auto burglary in the 100 court area of the University Village. MTr. 
5,6. The only additional detail provided to the officers, was the 
sketchy description of a single individual suspect that broadly 
targeted any and all "male[s], possibly Hispanic, chunky in build 
and wearing a white T-shirt." MTr. 1,2,3. No car or other 
individuals were mentioned by the dispatch report. MTr. 1-6. 
In response to the report, Officer Bradfield arrived at the 
100 court area where she briefly stopped a lone individual at the 
scene. MTr. 15,16. He appeared to be a "male, possibly Hispanic, 
chunky in build wearing a white T-shirt" but he was able to escape 
extensive police questioning. MTr. 16 As with Mr. Case and Mr. 
Farnsworth, who were legitimately on the premises to drop off Mr. 
Case's girlfriend at her home in the 800 court of the University 
Village, the single individual also apparently had a valid 
justification for his whereabouts at the time. MTr. 7,8,16,19. 
The parties do not dispute that appellant James Case looked 
nothing like the reported suspect. Mr. Case has short dark-brown 
hair, is light and fair in complexion, weighs approximately 136 
pounds, and is 5 feet 7 inches tall. Officer LeFavre testified 
that Mr. Case was not the individual described by the dispatch. 
MTr. 4. Similarly, Mr. Case's cousin Richard Farnsworth, also was 
unlike the individual, reportedly clothed in a white T-shirt. 
Farnsworth wore a black leather jacket, which covered all but six 
or seven inches of a pink T-shirt. MTr. 8,9,12. The shirt had 
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"psychedelic colors across the top of it, a logo, pink and purple 
logo on the right pocket," "it had deep purple sort of floral pink 
and colors in there and gold as well." MTr. 5. Any white portions 
w e r e either covered or contained narrowly in a band around a middle 
section of the shirt. MTr. 5. Throughout the motion to suppress 
hearing, the trial judge and counsel for each party repeatedly 
referred to the shirt as pink. MTr. 8,11,21. As explained by the 
lower court, on the night of the stop Mr. Farnsworth was wearing a 
pink design T-shirt covered by a black leather jacket. MTr. 12, 
21, R. 100. 
While police dispatch reported no concrete crime and only a 
single individual on foot, Officer LeFavre nonetheless stopped two 
individuals, James Case and passenger Richard Farnsworth, in a 
car.1 MTr. 2. Since, Office LeFavre admitted that Mr. Case did not 
resemble the person described by dispatch, Mr. Farnsworth's 
Hispanic appearance appears to be the only basis for the stop.2 
Other than Farnsworth's face, the officer could only see Richard's 
black jacket and at best, pink shirt. While Richard may be "chunky 
in build," the investigating officer had not yet realized Richard's 
5 foot 6 inch, 184 pound stature because of Richard's position as 
a passenger in the car made everything unobservable except 
1
 Officer LeFavre made no attempt to independently 
corroborate any of the information provided in the dispatch. MTr. 
2. 
2
 Interestingly, the trial court stated on the record that 
Mr. Farnsworth was "clearly not hispanic [, ] " MTr. 20, 21, which 
leaves the officer with no basis other than an unsubstantiated 
hunch for stopping the vehicle. 
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Richard's face and shoulders. MTr. 2,7,9,10. Richard Farnsworth's 
upper body was of course covered by the black leather coat. MTr. 9. 
At the time of the stop, officers determined that Mr. Case and Mr. 
Farnsworth did in fact have a valid reason for being in the 
University of Utah Village. MTr. 17. The trial court made a 
similar finding although it still determined that the officers 
after the fact detection of alcohol was not improper. Mr. Case 
appeals the propriety of the initial stop and the baseless facts 
upon which the officer relied. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Considered in the "totality of the circumstances" the 
information available to the officer stopping Mr. Case on June 26, 
1992 did not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion. The 
officer responded to a vague dispatch based on an anonymous phone 
call. The only information known to the officer at the time of the 
stop was that there was a "possible car prowl" and the possible 
suspect was described as "male, possible Hispanic, chunky in build 
wearing a white T-shirt." In spite of the officer's lack of 
information he stopped Mr. Case and his passenger, prior to 
attempting to corroborate any of the dispatch information. The 
officer did not observe any criminal wrong doing on the part of Mr. 
Case or his passenger. In addition to the deficiencies in the 
information forming the basis of the stop, the information 
available to the officer and the description of Mr. Case and his 
circumstances was not sufficiently similar to warrant the stop. By 
the officer's own admission Mr. Case did not match the suspect 
7 
description, there were two individuals not one as in the dispatch, 
they were in a vehicle which was not mentioned in the dispatch. 
The officer testified that he stopped the vehicle based on the 
passenger, Mr. Farnsworth's appearance. However, Mr. Farnsworth 
also did not match the dispatch description as he was wearing a 
pink T-shirt covered by a leather jacket and was seated in a low 
riding vehicle, not an individual on foot wearing a white T-shirt. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE BROAD, GENERAL DESCRIPTION BROADCAST BY RADIO DISPATCH 
LACKED SUFFICIENT DETAIL OR SIMILARITY TO MR. CASE AND HIS 
SITUATION TO CONSTITUTE REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP HIS VEHICLE. 
A. The Stop of Mr. Case and His Vehicle was a Level Two 
Encounter Subject to Constitutional and Statutory Protections. 
"It is well settled that a police officer's stop of a vehicle 
is a 'seizure' and therefore subject to fourth amendment 
protections." State v. Parker, 834 p.2d 592, 594 (Utah App. 1992) 
(citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 653 (1979)). The 
vehicular stop of Mr. Case and Mr. Farnsworth constituted a "level 
two" encounter, an intrusion requiring a reasonable articulable 
suspicion. State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) (per 
curiam); Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15. "Anything less would invite 
intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing 
more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has 
consistently refused to sanction. And simple 'good faith on the 
part of the arresting officer is not enough.'" Terry v. Ohio. 392 
U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) , quoted in State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 
(Utah App. 1987). 
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The Supreme Court has adopted a "totality of the circumstance" 
test to be applied in determining whether an officer had 
"reasonable articulable suspicion" that the particular individual 
being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. United States v. Cortez, 
449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 328-29 (1990); 
State v. Potter, 863 P.2d 40, 43 (Utah App. 1993) . The facts are 
to be "judged against an objective standard: would the facts 
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure. . . 'warrant 
a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief7 that the action 
taken was appropriate?" State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 
1990). 
B. The Anonymous Phone Call to the University of Utah Police Lacked 
Necessary Detail and Specificity to Support Reasonable Suspicion to 
Stop Based on the Resulting Dispatch Report. 
The factual deficiencies in this matter start with the 
uncertain and unproven nature of the source, a caller whose 
identity remains anonymous. The State bears the burden of proving 
that intrusion into a citizen's life was justified. See State v. 
Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1049 & n.16 (Utah App. 1992), State v. 
Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987). "[T]he source of the 
tip must provide 'enough indicia of reliability to justify' 
interference with the privacy rights of a suspect." State v. White, 
856 P. 2d 656 (Utah App. 1993) . In the present case the State bore 
the burden of proving that the basis of the dispatch call was 
sufficient to rise to the level of reasonable suspicion. The State 
did not meet their burden, no evidence as to the identity of the 
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caller or what basis existed for the caller's information was 
presented at the hearing. 
A police office can establish reasonable suspicion by 
personally observing criminal activity, Sandy City v. Thorsness, 
778 P.2d 1011, 1012(Utah App. 1989), or by receiving reliable 
information via radio broadcast. See State v. Bruce, 779 P. 2d 
646,650 (Utah 1989). However, the information contained in the 
bulletin must be supported by reasonable suspicion: 
We conclude that, if a flyer or bulletin has been issued 
on the basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable 
suspicion that the wanted person has committed an 
offense, then reliance on that flyer or bulletin 
justifies a stop. . . If the flyer [or bulletin] has been 
issued in the absence of a reasonable suspicion, then a 
stop in the objective reliance upon it violates the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Id. at 650 (Citing United States v. Henslev, 469 U.S. 221, 232-33 
(1985)). 
"Reasonable suspicion . . . is dependent upon both the content 
of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. 
Both factors - quantity and quality - are considered in the 
totality of the circumstances - the whole picture." Alabama v. 
White, 496 U.S. 328, 330 (1990), State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 649-
50 (Utah 1989) (Police cannot rely on another person's unfounded 
suspicions--even if that person is another officer); State v. 
Black, 721 P.2d 842, 844 (Or. App. 1986); State v. Benson, 251 
N.W.2d 659, 661 (Neb. 1977) . The information provided to the 
police must be objectively reliable to support the subsequent stop. 
Black, 721 P. 2d at 844. In Black, the Oregon Court of Appeals 
ruled that a witness tip describing "a brown Ford Escort traveling 
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north on Highway 199, was speeding and weaving" was insufficient 
dispatch information to justify a level II stop.3 The Oregon court 
found that information relayed by the unidentified caller did not 
form "an objective basis for reasonably suspecting that the 
defendant had committed the crimes of DUI or reckless driving or 
both" Id. at 844. The court's inquiry focused on whether the 
information possessed collectively by the officer and the 
dispatcher gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that a crime had 
been committed. Id. See also Thorsness, 778 P. 2d at 1012 
(reasonable suspicion is determined from facts known to the officer 
along with reasonable inferences drawn from those facts); State v. 
Thompson, 231 Neb. 771, 438 N.W. 2d 131, 136 (1989) (emphasis in 
original) ("a reasonably founded suspicion to stop a vehicle cannot 
be based solely on the receipt by the stopping officer of a radio 
dispatch to stop the described vehicle without any proof of the 
factual foundation for the relayed message") ; Olson v. Commissioner 
of Public Safety, 371 N.W. 2d 552, 556 (Minn. 1985) (The court held 
"If police can not stop a car. .on the basis of a mere whim, neither 
can they stop on the basis, for all they know, or the mere whim of 
an anonymous caller.")4 
3
 The stopping officer in Black observed no erratic driving 
patterns and noted that the vehicle was driving the speed limit. 
Ms. Black was arrested and charged with driving under the influence 
of intoxicants. 
4
 This Court has previously considered police stops based 
on a phone tip from a known caller in State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). In addition to the fact that in Roth the 
caller identified himself there are several other facts that 
distinguish the present case from Roth. Roth involved a phone call 
from hospital security informing police of an intoxicated male 
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The appropriate inquiry for this court is whether the 
information possessed collectively by the officer and the 
dispatcher gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity. State v. Black, 721 P.2d 842, 844 (Or. App. 1986) The 
knowledge possessed by the dispatch and Officer LeFavre was simply 
that there was a possible car prowl in the 100 court of the 
University Village and that the suspect was "a chunky male, 
possibly Hispanic, wearing a white T-shirt." At the time of the 
stop Officer Lefavre had no personal knowledge of any facts 
regarding criminal activity by Mr. Case or Mr. Farnsworth. No 
evidence existed as a basis for the allegation that a car prowl or 
automobile burglary was in progress or about to take place. In 
fact, one officer testified that there was no evidence at the scene 
that such a crime had occurred. The scant information relayed to 
the officer provided no basis to suspect criminal activity. The 
only information known to the officer was that there was an 
unsubstantiated report of a possible car prowl or automobile 
burglary. 
In the present case the reliability of the call is further 
suspect in that the description of the individual and the crime 
were vague. There is no evidence before the court as to the 
caller's veracity, the basis for the assumption that a crime was 
driving and the caller provided police with the make, color and 
license number of the car. Additionally the officer observed the 
vehicle driving in a slow jerky manner, consistent with a drunk 
driving pattern. In the case at bar, unlike in Roth the identity 
of the caller is completely unknown, as is are any bias' the caller 
may have had in providing the information. 
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being committed or motive for calling the police.5 There is no 
basis to assume that the caller was the average citizen informant 
and therefore inherently reliable. Assuming that all calls to 
police were from average citizen informants would encourage misuse 
police and 911 services. Such an assumption would allow persons 
with unsure or misguided motives to pass information through the 
emergency lines to cleanse the tainted information. To prevent 
misuse the dispatch operator must gather sufficient information to 
ensure that there is reasonable suspicion that a crime is occurring 
or about to occur. If sufficient information cannot be gathered the 
officer must attempt to corroborate the information. 
In the present case no attempt was made to acquire additional 
information regarding the caller or their information. Therefore, 
the dispatch report was not based on reasonable articulable 
suspicion and the officer may not rely on the report to acquire 
reasonable articulable suspicion. 
C. The Dispatch Report was Overly Broad and Lacking in Articulable 
Suspicion 
Police radio broadcasts must be specifically narrow to provide 
reasonable suspicion to stop an individual matching that 
description. Commonwealth v. Cheek, 413 Mass. 492, 597 N.E.2d 1029 
(Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1992) (The court held a dispatch alerting 
officers to be on the lookout for a "black male with a three-
5
 In the case of State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 661-62 (Utah 
App. 1993) this court addressed the importance of "assessing the 
reliability of third party tip[s].fl In discussing this issue the 
court cited Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1973) for the 
proposition "that a known informer constituted a stronger 
justification than an anonymous telephone tip.) 
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quarter length goose-down jacket" suspected in a stabbing was too 
broad to provide reasonable suspicion.) "To permit police 
investigative stops under the sparse facts present in this case 
[Cheek] would be to encourage unduly intrusive police practice." 
See also Van Patten v. State, 697S.W.2d919 (Ark.App. 1985) (radio 
dispatch providing "extremely general information about a xloud 
party' and a 'brown jeep'" was too vague and based on insufficient 
information to support a reasonable suspicion analysis.) 
Similar to the facts in Cheek the description in the present 
case, "a male, possibly Hispanic, chunky in build and wearing a 
white T-shirt" is so broad it includes such a large spectrum of the 
population that investigative stops based on this information would 
allow offices to intrude on the rights of innocent citizens. In 
the present case no basis for the allegation of a car prowl was 
presented. The caller provided no details of the cars that had 
been burglarized, or any facts as to the basis of their suspicions. 
Certainly, appearing to be Hispanic and chunky while walking 
through the University Village is not a crime. Yet, this is all 
the information available to support the allegation of criminal 
activity. Even if Mr. Farnsworth looked like the description 
there was no reasonable suspicion that any crime occurred or was 
occurring. 
D. Mr. Case nor his Passenger Sufficiently Matched the Dispatch 
Description to Warrant the Illegal Stop by the Officer 
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The issue of reasonable suspicion to stop a motorist has been 
addressed by the Utah courts on numerous occasions,6 however, there 
is no brightline test in which to determine the degree of 
similarity between a suspect and a dispatch description necessary 
to support an investigative stop. State v. Parker, 834 P.2d 592, 
595 (Utah App. 1992) ("It is axiomatic that presence at or near the 
[location], without more, does not give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity"); See also State v. Steward, 806 
P. 2d 213 (Utah App. 1991) . Reasonable suspicion issues are highly 
fact sensitive and must be carefully considered on the facts of 
each individual case. State v. Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rpts 3(Utah 
1994) . 
Utah case law addressing stops based on dispatch reports have 
considered fact situation in which the officers had significantly 
more detailed accounts of the crimes and descriptions of the 
suspects. See State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 648 (Utah 1989), Pena, 
232 Utah Adv. Rpts. 3-7, (Utah 1994). Unlike the present matter, 
Bruce and Pena each involve known citizen witnesses, who provided 
the basis for the information they provided for the police 
dispatch, the descriptions were specific and specific criminal acts 
were reported. 
In Bruce the appearance of the individual stopped, the car and 
individuals in the car were substantially similar to the broadcast 
6
 See State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Swaniaan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), Sandv City v. Thorsness, 778 
P.2d 1011 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Truiillo 739 P.2d 85 (Utah 
App. 1987); and State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988). 
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description, the two matched on all points. The responding officer 
stopped a orange Datsun station wagon with two black males in the 
front seat, the dispatch description was "orange Datsun or 
Volkswagen four-door sedan or station wagon with two black males 
suspected of robbery, both riding in the front seat." id. at 648. 
The description was provided to officers by a witness to a 
convenience store robbery. She and another witness provided 
officers with additional details of the suspects and the crime that 
were not relayed over the dispatch. 
Unlike the present case, in Bruce the reporting witness and 
the basis for her information were known to the dispatching 
officers. The facts currently before this court are at the 
opposite end of the factual spectrum; two individuals were stopped 
in a car exiting the University Village; the broadcast noted one 
individual, apparently on foot in the 100 court of the University 
Village, the officer's identified suspect was not Hispanic looking, 
he was not wearing a white T-shirt, but a pink T-shirt and a black 
leather jacket; and he was seated in a low riding car leaving those 
outside the car with no way to assess his stature. 
Similarly Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rpts. at 3-7, also illustrates 
the inadequacies of the facts presently before the court. In Pena, 
there was a known crime, the theft of prophylactics, and an 
identified reporting witness, a 7-eleven clerk, with an identified 
basis for the information, the clerks personal observations. The 
clerk provided a detailed description of the suspect and the 
vehicle in which he was riding, including the license number. Id. 
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at 3. In contrast, the insufficiency of the dispatch report 
presently before the court cannot be overlooked. The individual 
providing information to the University Police Dispatch is unknown, 
as is the basis of their information. The caller, nor dispatch 
provided a description of a vehicle, in fact there was no mention 
of a vehicle in the description. 
When officer LeFavre stopped Mr. Case he was on legitimate 
business in a place open to the public that also happened to be in 
the area of reported "possible" criminal activity. This court has 
held that this does not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion 
to stop. In State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 216 officers engaged 
in an investigation of drug activity stopped a truck driving into 
the area of the investigation. This court held, "The mere driving 
of a pickup truck, on a public road, at 11:50, is insufficient, 
without more, to raise reasonable suspicion that its occupant was 
involved in criminal activity." Mr. Case's actions were even less 
suspicious than those of Mr. Steward, because Mr. Steward attempted 
to leave the scene. Mr. Case stopped his vehicle when signaled by 
the officer. Mr. Case at no time conducted himself in a manner 
consistent with criminal activity. The facts of this case do not 
give rise to any suspicion that criminal activity occurred, 
particularly, that Mr. Case or Mr. Farnsworth were engaged in any 
criminal activity. The officer had insufficient information and 
the information that he did have was not sufficiently similar to 
Mr. Case or Mr. Farnsworth to stop them on suspicion of any 
criminal activity. 
17 
There are several discrepancies between the dispatch 
description and Mr. Case's circumstances. The fact that there was 
no mention of a vehicle indicates that the caller was describing an 
individual on foot. Officer Bradfield made the more logical stop 
of a lone pedestrian, rather than two individuals in a car. 
Additionally, Mr. Farnsworth did not match the description of 
"male, possibly Hispanic, chunky in build wearing a white T-shirt." 
Mr. Farnsworth was wearing a pink T-shirt, covered by a leather 
jacket, he was seated in a vehicle, obstructing his stature, and he 
was with Mr. Case not alone or on foot. 
The facts currently before this Court, considered in the 
totality of the circumstances, do not support the officers alleged 
reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Case and Mr. Farnsworth. Based on 
the illegal stop of an individual who only vaguely resembled the 
dispatch description in violation of the United States and Utah 
constitutions and Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 Mr. Case requests that 
all evidence stemming from the stop be suppressed.7 
7
"Absent reasonable suspicion, evidence derived from the stop 
is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' and must be excluded." State v. 
Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. 
Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1988)). Thus, all evidence 
gathered by Officer LeFavre after he stopped Mr. Case should be 
suppressed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial absent the 
illegally seized evidence. 
Respectfully submitted this Jb day of May, 1994. 
DEBORAH KREECK MENDEZ /<\^~ 
Attorney for Defendant/AppeTrfant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Q: Did you or Rich get out of the car in the 100 court? 
A: Just me. No, not in 100 in 800. 
Q: In 800 you got out of the car and where'd you walk? 
A: Just her to her door and back to the car and then leaving. 
Q: And Rich never got out of the car? 
A: No. 
Q: That's all. 
JUDGE: Cross. 
ATP: No, thank you. 
JUDGE: Nothing, you can have a seat. 
ATD: That will be everything for the defense. 
JUDGE: Alright, it's your motion so I'll give you that first 
opportunity. 
JUDGE: Let me ask you this before you start. The critical issue is 
obviously and I'll be willing to find at this point, Mr. Farnworth 
who was the passenger who may or may not have been the subject of the 
dispatch is male with all due respect it's fair to describe him and I 
would as chunky. He has medium brown hair I wouldn't say that 
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it's dark brown hair. He's clearly not Hispanic. I'd be willing to 
find based on his testimony nothing to controvert it that he was 
wearing a pink t-shirt not a white t-shirt on the evening in 
question. That he was wearing a jacket that was zippered in the 
front which would expose some of the front of the t-shirt, but that 
he was covering the shirt with the jacket. So based on those finding 
I think that the evidence preponderates that way. I guess the legal 
question is and I'll also I further find that even though Mr. Case 
and Mr. Farnworth had not stopped in the 100 Court even Mr. Case's 
testimony was that they had to drive by 100 Court to get in and out 
of the 800 Court area on their errand. So I suppose the question is 
how close does the description have to meet. I think you would 
stipulate wouldn't you counsel that if in fact Mr. Farnworth had been 
Hispanic if he had been wearing a white t-shirt that if he were this 
close to the 100 Court block then there would be reasonable 
suspicion, is that correct? 
ATD: No, your honor, I wouldn't stipulate to that because I 
believe they needed the dispatch tape here. I believe the dispatch 
tape has to be there has to be we need to know who this informant 
was. Was this an anonymous tip or is it a citizen's call. They 
allow her to, just a minute I have to get my bearings, 
JUDGE: Sure. 
ATD: If you look at there's a lot of case law around this state 
and we need to determine is this an inherently reliable tip. We 
can't have citizen's using other people in this way and maybe they 
wouldn't, but I think if you look at People v. Garcia, where an 
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anonymous tip calls and said so and so was leaving at 1:30 their 
brown cars parked out in the back and there'll be 1/2 ounce of 
cocaine under the hood. Although the court ruled there was 
reasonable suspicion there I think that's it's fraught with the 
possibilities of a set-up. We see all kinds of domestic matters 
where people do set-ups. I think that the dispatch office needs to 
go a little further and determine who this person calling was. 
There's been no evidence that this is a citizen's call. I think if 
we look at State v. Roth, that just came down from the Court of 
Appeals, again there, they said there was reasonable suspicion 
because they knew and they specifically stated that it was the 
University of Utah Hospital Security Police. Therefore, it had a 
reliability because their job was to determine in Roth they gave a 
description of the individual, the color of the car, the license 
plates number of the car, the direction it would be traveling. The 
officer drove up and found it right there. I think that there has to 
be something further substantiating this in the totality of the 
circumstances. I think the officer has to have or if not the 
dispatch officer has to have more information and more knowledge. 
Cases that bear this out are Olsen v. The Commission of Public 
Safety, which is a Minnesota case, 3 71 N.W.2d 552 and there it says 
while their dispatch was in possession of specific and articulable 
facts supporting reasonable suspicion is essential. In that case it 
was a DUI. In this case was are the articulable facts that a car 
prowl occurred? All we know is that there was someone out in the 100 
Court. I don't believe that that's reasonable suspicion. We 
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could have anytime we see someone on the street we could call the 
police and the police would haves to come out. Maybe the dispatch 
office knew that, but the City has not presented or bore their burden 
on that. In City of Wake Forest v. Ducran, again, they said it's the 
burden of the facts the burden lies on the officer, the facts 
available to the officer. You heard him testify all he knew is a 
chunky individual, Hispanic looking, with a white t-shirt. Well, 
maybe if we mix the two my client and Rich you might get that 
description but separately we have a chunky individual wearing a pink 
t-shirt and to my eye he doesn't look Hispanic to me. I have other 
cases if the court wants them, but the continuing theme is we have 
specific cars, specific colors, specific suspect identification and 
drivers licenses and most of these are DUI cases, and a driving 
pattern or something more. Absent the driving pattern or criminal 
behavior. The courts have overturned it said, we must suppress. 
ATP: All of the cases she has cited to, your honor, refer to 
stopping the individual that they intended to stop, subsequently 
arresting him on the charge that the call was made on. In this case 
we're not anywhere near that. They stopped on an investigative stop 
based on a reasonable call from an individual stating someone is out 
in my parking lot. If she expects that the court should require 
citizen's screenings to be dealt with in the same fashion that a 
prosecutor deals with screenings. She's missed the mark. There's no 
court case out there that says that. The dispatcher has a duty to 
determine the inherent reliability, the reliability of the call to 
the best of their ability. Over the telephone that's very 
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simple. Somebody is committing a crime, could you investigate it? 
They didn't arrest anybody. They went and investigated. Based on 
that investigative stop, they determined that an individual that was 
in close proximity to the person they wanted to question was in fact 
under the influence of alcohol. Their stop was not questionable in 
any respect. They had from two officers testimony an individual who 
fit in their opinions the descriptions that had been dispatched. The 
officers had subjective 
SIDE B cont. 
articulable facts which caused the stop. In this case they had a 
chunky individual wearing a white t-shirt. The court indicated there 
was no evidence that he wasn't wearing a jacket. I would proffer to 
the court Officer LaFavre did indicate that the individual was in a 
t-shirt only that there was no jacket involved. I would also 
indicate that the defendant's appearance at 3:00 o'clock in the 
morning is close enough to Hispanic that their subjective opinion is 
what the court has to look at not what we here in the light of day 
can see, but what they a car passing by them leaving the area that 
they're going to investigate would perceive. It's their perception 
and it is their perception that of a reasonable officer. We have two 
officers here both testifying to the same thing. That's the standard 
the court has to look to is what they performed here reasonable and 
would another officer under the similar circumstances. That's what 
the Utah State law is. 
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Would another officer under similar circumstances have responded in a 
like fashion. I don't think there's any evidence at all before this 
court to indicate otherwise. They both testified to the light 
colored t-shirt, they both believe it was a white t-shirt. And given 
that that is the state of the law right now in Utah I don't believe 
the court has any choice but to find there was reasonable suspicion 
for the stop. 
ATD: Your honor, Mr. Zollinger is asking you to give more 
credibility to the officers. In every jury trial we ask can you 
equally weigh the evidence. I don't believe the officers' testimony 
is any more credible than Mr. than Rich's. Rich, there's no evidence 
that he lies. There's nothing to doubt his credibility. Further, I 
think Roth our most recent Court of Appeals decision discusses the 
reliability of the informant. It goes into discussing why in Roth 
the informant was reliable. We don't know anything about this 
informant. The Oregon Supreme Court stated: 
We hold that an anonymous tip in this case has to have some 
inditia of reliability in order for it to give rise to 
reasonable suspicion. 
I sense the overtones of Mr. Zollinger's argument is that this 
something less than reasonable suspicion we need. It's not. It has 
to be reasonable suspicion and I just don't think its here. Even 
based on the facts if you want to skip the dispatch argument Rich 
does not look Hispanic, he was wearing a pink t-shirt and he was 
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wearing a black leather jacket. He's not prepped in the law. 
There's no reason to lie. He didn't understand the reasonable 
suspicion argument. I just think even absent the argument on 
dispatch and if you want more I'm sorry I didn't write a memoranda on 
this as requested, however, I got the discovery yesterday and rather 
than put this off I tried to work from there. I would be glad to 
brief this for the court on the issue of whether the reliability of 
the informant. You don't have a dispatch tape here. He said a 
citizen called and said there's a person in my yard or in my courtho, 
or my parking lot. I didn't hear that in the evidence at all. 
That's it. 
JUDGE: It seems to me there are two issues, we probably need to 
look at both of them. I guess this isn't a tip situation, this is a 
caller inherently anyway. The reasonable inference is someone 
complained about a car prowler and the officers were called to 
investigate and I guess the first issue is seems to me your question 
before the officers can stop anybody in response to a dispatch call 
they have to have a certain amount of information. And I guess the 
question is how much information do they have to have. If someone 
calls and reports a car prowl or a car burglary which is what a car 
prowl is, before the officer can stop anybody I guess they have to 
have a certain amount of information. What is that? A quantum of 
informat ion you have to have that seems to me to be the first issue 
and then the second issue is before a stop can be reasonable how 
closely to the description much the subject of the stop fit? 
Obviously officers can't go out when they're given a description of 
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the suspect and stop just anybody. If the stop isn't reasonable I 
would think both sides would agree to that. Even in their own minds 
they have some subjective reason for thinking gee maybe this person's 
it even though he a lot different or she's a lot different from the 
person that was described, the stop wouldn't be reasonable. There 
has to be some objective standard to look at in saying no this was 
the description given, this is the description of the subject of the 
stop, how closely do they have to match? And I'm not familiar with 
any case that talks about that. That would seem to me to be the 
focus of your research and I'd ask you if you would counsel to 
prepare something and have it ready by let's see, the trial is set 
for October the 14th so I'll ask you to be ready with something let's 
say October the 5th and then Mr. Zollinger you can respond by the 
13th. We won't have time to have a reply memorandum submitted. But 
to focus on those two issues, and as I said the second one is my main 
concern because this isn't really a tip this isn't someone calling 
the police and saying hey look if you stop Mr. so and so you're going 
to find some drugs. This is an actual call a complaint and it has 
more of an emergency overtone and it would seem to me the police need 
a lot less information before they can investigate that than they 
would just that kind of a tip that it maybe your cases Ms. Kreeck 
Mendez that you've referred to would deal with. But if you want to 
look at that issue too. 
ATD: Alright. 
JUDGE: So the deadlines are October the 5th and October the 13 for 
a reply and then I'll give you my ruling sometime prior to the trial 
and I suppose it may be dispositive depending on how I go. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On June 26, 1992, University of Utah Police Officer LeFevre was dispatched 
to a suspected car prowl, or vehicle burglary, in a common parking area at the 100 
court of the University Village sometime after midnight. 
2. The dispatcher gave Officer LeFevre the following description of the suspect: 
a chunky male, possibly Hispanic, wearing a white t-shirt. These were the only 
details provided by the dispatcher. 
3. The officer did not know who had phoned in the complaint. 
4. When approaching the University Village shortly after the dispatch the 
officer saw a car with a passenger who, in the officer's judgment, appeared to 
match the description of the dispatch. The passenger appeared to be chunky, and 
hispanic, and was wearing a light t-shirt 
5. At the time the officer first observed the car and the passenger they were 
not in the 100 court area, but could have been driving away from that location. 
6. The officer stopped the car near the entrance to University Village on 
Sunnyside Boulevard. 
7. After the officer stopped the car he approached the passenger, who had 
given rise to the officer's first suspicion. The passenger was a man by the name 
of Richard Farnsworth. 
8. Mr. Farnsworth is: male; fits the description of chunky, approximately 5'6*\ 
184 lbs.; and has brown hair which is moderate to dark. Farnsworth is not 
hispanic. 
9. At the time of the stop, Mr. Farnsworth was wearing a pink t-shirt which 
was covered by dark leather jacket, the jacket was partially zipped. The upper 
part of the t-shirt would have been visible to the officer, even though Mr. 
Farnsworth was seated. 
10. The officer who stopped Mr. Farnsworth thought he was stopping the 
subject of the earlier dispatch. 
11 . Based on the description that the officer had received, it was reasonable to 
think that the vehicle he was stopping contained the subject of the dispatch. 
12. The driver of the car that Mr. Farnsworth was riding in was Mr. Case. 
13. Mr. Case was arrested subsequently for Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol after other evidence which was in plain view and plain smell gave rise to 
additional suspicions which the officer then acted upon. 
14. Mr. Case and Mr. Farnsworth were at the University Village on legitimate 
business- They had not burglarized any vehicles. 
15. Mr. Case and Mr. Farnsworth were originally in the 800 court area of the 
University Village, but did drive near the 100 court area of the University Village 
when exiting the area. 
16. Mr. Farnsworth did not actually get out of the car while at the University 
Village. 
17. The officer's detention of Farnsworth was brief. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The officer did not use the dispatch as a pretext to stop the vehicle. He 
thought that he was stopping the subject of the dispatch. 
2. The officer's stop of the vehicle was based on objective articulable facts 
such that the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the passenger, Farnsworth, 
was involved in criminal activity. The passenger's appearance, and proximity to 
the reported criminal activity, gave rise to that suspicion. 
DATED this lZj> day of December, 1992. 
Robin W. Reese 
Third Circuit Court Judge 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
3. The dispatch provided sufficient information on which 
an officer could base reasonable suspicion to arrest 
someone matching the dispatch description. 
Specifically, the dispatch included: 
1) alleged crime a car prowl, 
2) location of the car prowl, 
and 3) information regarding the suspect. 
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ADDENDUM B 
UXAH uuun u* CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
W.7-15. Authority of peace officer to «to« .„, 
A peace officer may stoo anv « * « Z 7 ^ 
™ ^ name, addreas and an explanation of h t 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.) 
The right of the people to be secure in their p« 
sons, houses, papers, and effects* against unncaMC 
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, as: 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable SUM 
supported by Oath or iffim**™* and parucubrH 
dosrritiinf the place to be searched, and the penea 
er things to be seized. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec 7. [Due process of lawj 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law. vm 
Sec 14. (Unreasonable searches forbidden «. 
Issuance of warrant.] "* 
Hie right of the people to be secure in thf-tr i^. 
sons, houses, papers and effects against unmi^ .t,;' 
searches and seizures shall not be violated. ^j± » 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cau~ ^ / 
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly drrrH^ 
the place to be searched. and the person or thine wi» 
